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OREGON LAW REVIEW
NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- DUE PROCESS OF
LAIW-LIBERTY-FREE SPEECH *
Gitlow v. ATew York
In Gitlow v. New York' the federal Supreme Court for
the first time unanimously assumes that freedom of
speech and of the press are among the "liberties" protected
from state impairment by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 Gitlow was convicted in New
York of violating a statute that forbade the advocacy of
the doctrine that organized government should be over-
thrown by force or by the assassination of rulers or by any
unlawful means.' This was affirmed by the state appellate
courts4 and brought to Washington on writ of error. It
was urged for the defendant that, while he had advocated
the forcible overthrow of government, the liberty clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment protected such utterances
save under circumstances where some actual evil was likely
to flow from such advocacy-which, it was argued, was
not the case here, it being very unlikely that anyone would
be moved to illegal action by the defendant's manifesto,
published in an organ of the Left Wing socialist.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction (Holmes
and Brandeis, TJ., dissenting) as no impairment of legiti-
mate free speech, though admitting that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected proper "liberties" of this sort. In
view of the earlier decisions of the same court that Con-
gress did not violate the First Amendment in forbidding
certain utterances designed to interfere with the conduct
of the war (even though there was no proof of a "clear
and present danger" that such utterances would have such
actual effect),' this result was to be expected. It would
Republished from April issue of the Illinois Law Review, V. 20, p. 809.
1 (1925) 45 S. Ot. Rep. 625.
2 Ibid. at p. 630.
a (1909) N. Y. Laws, e. 88; N. Y. Penal Law, ss. 160-161.
4 People v. Gitlow (1921) 195 App. D. 773; affd. (1922) 234 N. Y. 132,
539.
5 Abrams v. United States (1919) 250 U. S. 616; Schaefer v. United
States (1920) 251 U. S. 466; Pierce v. United States (1920) 252 U. S. 239.
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have been extraordinary to hold that the Fourteenth
Amendment (and the Fifth, in the same language) pro-
tected speech of a character not privileged by the First
Amendment. In none of the prior federal cases was the
effect of the Fifth Amendment discussed, but it must have
been assumed that it did not go further than the First as
regards free speech.
In addition to the important assumption that within
proper limits free speech and a free press are a part of the
"liberty" guaranteed against state deprivation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the majority of the court persuasively
distinguishes the doctrine of Schenck v. United States6
from the Abrains, Schaefer, and Pierce cases! In the
Schenck case ar federal statute forbidding conspiracies to
obstruct the recruiting service was held to be violated by
circulating among drafted men an appeal to oppose the
draft, even though such appeal was not actually success-
ful, Mr. Justice Holmes saying, for the court:
"The question in every case is whether the words used
in such circumstances are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 8
In the other cases what was forbidden was not merely
a certain likelihood of undesired results that might or
might not be caused by the use of language, but the use of
certain language itself: e. g., in the A brams case, lan-
guage intended to incite resistance to the war and to cur-
tail the production of ammunition; and, in the Schaefer
and Peirce cases, language making false statements in-
tended to interfere with the military success of the United
States. In such cases-
"When the legislative body has determined generally,
in the constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utter-
ances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive
evil that they may be punished, the question whether any
specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is
likely in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil,
is not open to consideration. It is sufficient that the
6 (1919) 249 U. S. 47.
7See note 5, supra.
s (1919) 249 U. S. at 52.
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statute itself be constitutional and that the use of the-
language comes within its prohibition." 9
Of course, speech that could seldom, if ever, threaten
such dangers could not be arbitrarily forbidden, but-
"That utterances inciting to the overthrow of organ-
ized government by unlawful means, present a sufficient
danger of substantive evil to bring their punishment with-
in the range of legislation discretion, is clear. Such utter-
ances, by their very nature, involve danger to the public
peace and to the security of the state. They threaten
breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution. And the
immediate danger is none the less real and substantial,
because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately
foreseen. The state cannot reasonably be required to
measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice
balance of a jeweler's scale..... It cannot reasonably be
required to defer the adoption of measures for its own
peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead
to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and
immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in
the exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened
danger in its incipiency." 10
Whatever may have been the original conception of
"liberty" in our due process clauses, it was practically
inevitable that some freedom of speech should be included
within it after the unanimous statement of the Supreme
Court in Allgeyer v. Louisiana that it "Embraced the
right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of his facul-
ties." 11 The possibilities of a further extension of its
meaning are discussed somewhat apprehensively in a
recent leading article by Charles Warren,"2 who concludes
that-
"If the doctrine of the Gitlow case is to be carried to
its logical and inevitable conclusion, every one of the
rights contained in the Bill of Rights ought to be and
must be included within the definition of 'liberty', and
must be held to be guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against deprivation by a State 'without due process
of law ." ..
is Id. at 460.
9 45 S. Ct. Rep. at 631.
10 45 S. Ct. Rep. at 631.
11 165 U. 8. 578, 589 (1897).
12 $9 Harv. L. Rev. 431 (1926).
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He enumerates these potentially protected rights as
including the free exercise of religion, the right peacefully
to assemble, and the right to keep and bear arms; as well
as freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, self-
crimination, cruel and unusual punishments, and the
rights to indictment by a grand jury and to jury trial in
criminal and civil cases. As regards the first three, there
is little doubt that they are logically included, though only
the right to religious freedom would interpose any serious
obstacle to such hostile legislation as could be easily
imagined. So many plausible reasons may be given for
limiting the right to assemble or to bear arms that "lib-
erty" in these respects is rather illusory. Indeed, the same
is true of free speech itself." As regards the other rights
mentioned by Mr. Warren, it is difficult to believe that
their infringement is necessarily or usually any violation
of "liberty," even in an extended sense. Of course, after
a manner of speaking, it may be urged that a right to be
"free" from any kind of harmful or forbidden conduct is a
"liberty," because "freedom" and "liberty" are colloquially
synonymous. E. g., one has a common-law right to be
"free" from all manner of torts, therefore, any legislation
cutting down of duties to refrain from torts would be a
deprivation of "liberty" regardless of the character of the
duty affected. But, obviously, serious problems of consti-
tutional law are not to be settled by such a play upon words.
The answer to Mr. Warren's argument seems to be
this: It is only interferences with human activities by
directly preventing or forbidding or compelling them that
constitute infringements of "liberty." Directly to pre-
vent or to forbid a man from walking or talking or work-
ing or writing or praying, or indeed engaging in any other
human activity is properly enough an interference with
his "liberty"-and, if unreasonable, is without due pro-
cess. So, likewise, to compel him to walk or talk or work
or write or pray, against his will, interferes with "lib-
erty," though if done in a reasonable way for a reason-
able purpose it is not without due process. But to slan-
der him, or throw a stone through his window, or to break
14 See J. P. Hall "Free Speech in War Time" (1921). 21 Col. L. Rev.
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a contract with him, or to seize his property is not an in-
fringement of his "liberty," even though the ultimate result
of these acts is to diminish his social opportunities or his
pecuniary substance so that he will be less able (or "free")
to satisfy some of his desires. This inability, however,
results not from any direct interference, with his activities
as such, but from the creation of collateral conditions, like
unpopularity or poverty, that afford less favorable oppor-
tunities for the exercise of such activities. Such conduct
seems to affect "property" rather than "liberty." Of course,
rights of "liberty" and of "property" may often overlap.
A prohibition against (a) selling wholesome fruit, or (b)
drinking intoxicating liquor-each lawfully in A's pos-
session-is both an interference with his activities ("lib-
erty") and with the usual incidents of private ownership
("property"). In case (a) this would usually be without
due process (being unreasonable), while in case (b) it
would be with due process (being reasonable).
Of the various guaranties of the Bill of Rights urged
by Mr. Warren to be a part of "liberty" the following
analysis suggests itself: The right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures would ordinarily concern
"property" rather than "liberty," the latter being only col-
laterally affected. Compulsory self-crimination, if under-
stood as actually compelling a defendant to testify, would
be a violation of "liberty," but no one proposes this today.
What is proposed is that a court or jury be permitted to
draw an unfavorable inference from a defendant's volun-
tary failure to testify. This, in itself, is purely a matter
of procedure, not involving at this stage rights either of
"liberty" or of "property." If, later, as a result of such
a permissible inference, a defendant is imprisoned or fined,
then indeed "liberty" or "property" is affected, and the
question must be answered whether the procedure lead-
ing to this result complied with the requirements of due
process. So also of a defendant's rights to a grand or
petit jury in criminal or civil cases. These rights in them-
selves are neither a part of "liberty" nor of "property,"
but if, through a failure to observe them, a defendant is
imprisoned, fined, or subjected to loss of substance, then it
may be asked whether this result (which does effect "lib-
328
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erty" or "property") was achieved by procedural due pro-
cess. These questions have all been raised in the United
States Supreme Court and the answer uniformly has been
that such procedure was due process." It would seem to
be no less so, even if the procedural rights thus legislatively
taken away were conceived to be a part of "liberty," for
it is only deprivations of "liberty" without due process that
are forbidden. The right to be free from cruel and un-
usual punishments may involve "liberty," as, for instance,
if an outrageously long imprisonment were inflicted for
some trifling offense; but, if the objectionable punishment
consisted of branding, this would seem to be no violation
of "liberty."
Even though one does not share Mr. Warren's fears
of the possible connotations of "liberty" in the mind of the
Supreme Court, one may, however, heartily agree that
even its more restricted meaning should not straight-
jacket legislation, and that, as he puts it near the end of
his article:
"If the Court shall in the future give a broad inter-
pretation to the words 'due process' as affecting 'liberty';
if it shall be slow and reluctant to regard a state statute
as arbitrary or as bearing no reasonable relation to some
object of public welfare, then the Court may, by such
action, counteract some of the evils of undue interference
with state legislation, which otherwise may flow from the
enlarged definition of 'liberty' recently adopted by it." 11
JAMES PARKER HALL."7
15 Twining v. New Jersey 211 U. S. 97 (1908), (self-crimination);
Burtado v. California 110 U. B. 516 (1884), (grand jury unnecessary); Iowa
Cent. Ry. v. Iowa 160 U. 8. 389 (1896), (common-law jury unnecessary in
civil case); Maxwell v. Dow 176 U. S. 581 (1900), (same in criminal case).
16 39 Harv. L. Rev. at 464 (1926).
7. Dean of the Chicago University Law School.
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